On SBA-guaranteed lending and economic growth by Ben R. Craig et al.
working
paper
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND
04  03
On SBA-Guaranteed Lending and 
Economic Growth
by Ben R. Craig, William E. Jackson, III, 
and James B. ThomsonWorking papers of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland are preliminary materials 
circulated to stimulate discussion and critical comment on research in progress. They may not 
have been subject to the formal editorial review accorded official Federal Reserve Bank of 
Cleveland publications. The views stated herein are those of the authors and are not necessarily 
those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland or of the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System. 
 
Working papers are now available electronically through the Cleveland Fed’s site on the World 
Wide Web: www.clevelandfed.org/Research. 
 
 
 Ben Craig is at the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland and may be reached at ben.r.craig@clev.frb.org or 
(216) 579-2061. James Thomson at the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland and may be reached at 
jb.thomson@clev.frb.org or (216) 579-3022.   William E. Jackson III is at the Kenan-Flagler Business 
School at the University of North Carolina and may be reached at wej3@unc.edu




On SBA-Guaranteed Lending and Economic Growth 
 
By Ben R. Craig, William E. Jackson, III, and James B. Thomson 
 
Increasingly, policymakers are looking to the small business sector as a potential engine of economic 
growth.  Policies to promote small businesses include tax relief, direct subsidies, and indirect subsidies 
through government lending programs.  Encouraging lending to small business is the primary policy 
objective of the Small Business Administration (SBA) loan-guarantee program.  Using a panel data set of 
SBA-guaranteed loans we assess whether SBA-guaranteed lending has an observable impact on local and 
regional economic performance. 
 
JEL Classification: G38, H81, O16  







 .  The authors thank the 
Small Business Administration’s Office of Advocacy for providing SBA-guaranteed loan data and Pat 
Higgins for outstanding research support. 
 
 On SBA-Guaranteed Lending and Economic Growth 
 
 
The promotion of small businesses is a cornerstone of economic policy for a large 
number of industrialized countries.  Right or wrong, there appears to be a widely held 
perception that the small business sector is the incubator of growth, the place where 
innovation takes place and new ideas become economically viable business enterprises.  
Moreover despite the research findings of Davis et al. (2000) that the small business 
sector is not a net creator of jobs in the United States, policymakers routinely point to 
small businesses as important sources of employment growth.  Therefore, it is not 
surprising that there is widespread political support for government interventions aimed 
at promoting small business in the United States and increasingly around the world. 
  A widely held view among economists is that while markets are the best way to 
allocate scarce resources, sometimes government interventions can improve upon market 
outcomes.  Credit market imperfections, particularly in the market for small enterprise 
credit, are among the usual suspects cited as rationale for government intervention.  After 
all, there is reason to believe that the information-related problems that drive the credit 
rationing equilibrium of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) may be particularly severe in the 
market for small firm finance.  To the extent that small firms are credit rationed, 
government interventions in the form of direct credit or Small Business Administration 
(SBA) loan guarantees may be justified because of the deadweight losses associated with 
not funding all the projects in the economy that have positive-net-present-value. 
  We are interested in the efficacy of SBA guarantees of small enterprise loans.  
After all, the level of SBA activity in the small business loan market is not trivial.  The 
  1SBA's current business loan portfolio of roughly 219 000 loans worth more than $45 
billion makes it the largest single financial backer of US businesses in the nation.  Over 
the ten-year period (fiscal year) 1991-2000, the SBA assisted almost 435 000 small 
businesses in obtaining more than $94.6 billion in loans, more than in the entire history of 
the agency before 1991 (SBA, 2004).  Hence, the redistributive effects of the SBA’s loan 
guarantee programs may be economically important and raise the question as to whether 
the net benefits of these programs are positive. 
  To the extent that SBA loan guarantees mitigate credit market frictions these 
guarantees will result in improved capital allocation in the economy.  This in turn should 
have an impact on economic growth and development.  On the other hand, if SBA 
guarantees do not serve to reduce credit rationing in lending markets we should not 
observe a significantly positive correlation between the level of SBA guarantees and 
economic performance. In the latter case, SBA activities might be detrimental to 
economic growth as they would misallocate credit.  To examine this question we 
construct a data set containing all loans guaranteed by the SBA under its two main 
lending programs from 1990 through the end of 2000, measures of economic conditions, 
and market structure variables.  Using observations at the local market level we examine 
whether SBA-guaranteed lending significantly affects economic performance and 
economic growth—as measured by per capita income and log change in per capita 
income, respectively.  We find evidence consistent with SBA loan guarantees providing a 
positive impact on future economic growth.  
  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  In section 2 we provide a 
brief history of the SBA and an overview of its major lending programs.  Understanding 
  2the role Congress intended this agency to perform is essential in evaluating the social 
welfare implications of the SBA’s activities.  The historical record clearly shows that 
Congress created the SBA to mitigate perceived market imperfections that were reducing 
credit availability for small businesses.  In section 3 we provide a brief review of the 
academic literature on credit rationing and relationship lending.  This literature is 
consistent with the hypothesis that information problems in lending markets are 
particularly severe in the small enterprise credit market and hence provides a rationale for 
SBA loan guarantees.  Section 4 outlines the data, our hypotheses and empirical strategy.  
The results appear in section 5.  Overall, our empirical results are consistent with a 
positive, albeit small, impact of SBA guaranteed lending on personal income growth.  
Finally, our conclusions and future research questions are outlined in section 6. 
2.  A brief history of the SBA and its major credit extending programs 
The SBA was created on 30 July 1953 by the enactment of Public Law 163.  However, 
the SBA’s legislative purpose and mission had begun to take shape years earlier in a 
number of predecessor agencies.  These predecessor agencies included the Smaller War 
Plants Corporation (SWPC), the Small Defense Plants Administration (SDPA) and the 
Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC).  All of these agencies were created mainly as 
a response to the pressures of the Great Depression or World War II. 
  The primary predecessor agency of the SBA was the Reconstruction Finance 
Corporation (RFC).  The RFC was created in 1932 during the Hoover Administration.  Its 
mission was to help mitigate the financial crisis of the Great Depression by providing 
emergency capital to troubled commercial banks (Rhyme, 1988).  In 1934, the powers of 
the RFC were expanded and it became a full-fledged federal lending program for all 
  3firms hurt by the Depression, both large and small businesses and both financial and 
nonfinancial firms.  The extension of RFC authority to business lending is often 
considered the beginning of the present SBA 7(a) loan guarantee program (Rhyme, 
1988).  The RFC was also given the authority and responsibility to provide relief loans to 
individuals and organizations severely affected by natural disasters.  When the RFC was 
closed, the SBA was created to assume both the disaster and general business lending 
functions of the RFC.
1  However, the SBA’s business lending function was directed 
exclusively toward small business.  Some suggest that this limitation was the direct result 
of the banking industry’s successful lobbying to reduce the competition of government-
provided business lending programs, especially those that aided large businesses (Rhyme, 
1988).  The enabling legislation empowers the SBA to make loans to small business 
concerns either directly or in cooperation with banks or other lending institutions.
2  
  It is clear from the legislation that created the SBA that Congress perceived that 
small businesses face special problems in obtaining financing and that small business is a 
very important part of the American economy.  Congressional intent is stated distinctly in 
the act.
3   
The essence of the American economic system of private enterprise is free 
competition.  Only through full and free competition can free markets, free entry 
into business, and opportunities for the expression and growth of personal 
initiative and individual judgment be assured.  The preservation and expansion of 
                                                 
1 Public Law 163 abolished the RFC and created the SBA.  It also clearly stated the necessity for an agency 
like the SBA, set forth SBA’s mission, and described the powers the SBA would have at its disposal to 
carry out that mission.   
2  See Public Law 163, Section 207.  Section 207 empowers the SBA to assist small businesses in obtaining 
government contracts and to provide technical and managerial aids to small businesses. 
3 See Public Law 163, Section 202. 
  4such competition is not only to the economic well-being but to the security of this 
Nation.  Such security and well-being cannot be realized unless the actual and 
potential capacity of small business is encouraged and developed.  It is the 
declared policy of the Congress that the Government should aid, counsel, assist, 
and protect insofar as is possible the interests of small-business concerns in order 
to preserve free competitive enterprise, to insure that a fair proportion of the total 
purchases and contracts for supplies and services for the Government be placed 
with small-business enterprises, and to maintain and strengthen the overall 
economy of the Nation.
4 
Developments in loan programs 
By 1954, the SBA was already making direct business loans and guaranteeing bank loans 
to small businesses, as well as making loans to victims of natural disasters, working to 
get government procurement contracts for small businesses and helping business owners 
with management and technical assistance and business training.  Then, in 1958, the 
Investment Company Act established the Small Business Investment Company (SBIC) 
Program.  This program added directly to the credit granting authority of the SBA.  
Under the program the SBA licensed, regulated and helped provide funds for privately 
owned and operated venture capital investment firms. These firms specialized in 
providing long-term debt and equity investments to high-risk small businesses. Although 
the program was established as a temporary remedy to a specific problem, the program is 
still alive and fully operational today (Rhyme, 1988). 
                                                 
4 Congressional intent is also reflected in Section 204 of Public Law 163 which states, ‘In order to carry 
out the policies of this title there is hereby created an agency under the “Small Business 
Administration”…’.  Thus the primary mission of SBA became to ‘… aid, counsel, assist, and protect 
insofar as is possible the interests of small-business concerns’.   
 
  5  Over the years, the statutory authority and administrative structure of SBA’s 
business lending programs have been remarkably stable.  However, within this legal 
framework the SBA has made at least one major concession to the fact that private 
financial institutions are typically better at deciding which small business loans to 
underwrite than are government agencies.  This recognition led the SBA, in the mid-
1980s, to move away from making direct loans and toward making relatively more 
guaranteed (?) loans.  Currently, the SBA makes direct loans only under very special 
circumstances, and guaranteed lending is the main form of SBA lending.  The SBA’s 
main business lending programs are the 7(a) guaranteed loan program and the 504 loan 
program.    
The 7(a) guaranteed loan program  
The 7(a) loan program is the most basic and most significant among the SBA's business 
loan programs.  Its name comes from Section 7(a) of the Small Business Act, which 
authorizes the agency to provide business loans to American small businesses.  Loans 
from the 7(a) program are only available on a guaranty basis.  This means that they are 
provided by lenders who choose to structure their own loans according to (?) the SBA's 
requirements and who apply and receive a guaranty from the SBA on a portion of these 
loan.  The SBA does not fully guaranty 7(a) loans.  The SBA guaranty is usually in the 
range of 50 per cent to 85 per cent of the loan amount, and the maximum guaranty is 
$1 000 000.  The guaranty is a guaranty against payment default; the lender and the SBA 
share the risk that a borrower will not be able to repay the loan in full. The guaranty does 
not cover imprudent decisions by the lender or misrepresentation by the borrower (SBA, 
2004). 
  6  Under the guaranty concept, commercial lenders make and administer the loans, 
and small businesses apply to lenders for their financing.  The lender decides whether it 
will make a loan internally or if the application has some weaknesses which, in the 
lender’s opinion, mean the loan will require an SBA guaranty before it will be 
underwritten.  The guaranty that the SBA provides is available only to the lender.  It 
assures the lender that in the event of a payment default, the government will reimburse 
the lender for its loss, up to the percentage of SBA's guaranty.  Under the 7(a) program, 
the borrower remains obligated for the full amount due.  
The 504 loan program 
The 504 loan program is a long-term financing tool for economic development within a 
community.  The 504 program provides growing businesses with long-term, fixed-rate 
financing for purchasing major fixed assets (such as land or improvements, including 
new or existing buildings, grading, street improvements, utilities, parking lots, 
landscaping, the modernization, renovation or conversion of existing facilities, and long-
term machinery and equipment). SBA financing is provided through a certified 
development company (CDC), a nonprofit corporation set up to contribute to the 
economic development of its community.  CDCs work with the SBA and private-sector 
lenders to provide financing to small businesses.  There are about 270 CDCs nationwide, 
and each covers a specific geographic area (SBA, 2004).  
  Typically, a 504 project includes a loan secured by several entities: A senior lien 
from a private-sector lender covers up to 50 per cent of the project cost. A loan secured 
with a junior lien from the CDC covers up to 40 per cent of the cost (this loan is backed 
  7by a 100 per cent SBA-guaranteed debenture). A contribution of at least 10 per cent 
equity from the small business being helped is also required.   
  The maximum SBA debenture is $1 000 000 per project, where the project is 
defined in terms of a given set of job creation criteria or a community development goal.  
Generally, a business must create or retain one job for every $50 000 provided by the 
SBA.  The maximum SBA debenture is $1.3 million for projects that meet specific  
public policy goals recognized by the SBA.
5   
3.  SBA lending and the economics of credit markets 
Over the last ten years the SBA has been responsible for well over $100 billion in small 
business credit extensions, more than any single private lender.  Of course, this is what 
the SBA was created to do.  The agency’s primary mission as set forth by Congress, after 
all, is to assist small businesses in their quest for credit on reasonable terms.  But is the 
SBA program well-conceived public policy in the sense that it has been designed to 
improve the efficiency and equity of lending markets?  
  The answer to this question would appear to be yes if  Congress made at least 
three assumptions when it created the agency.  First, lawmakers had to assume that small 
business lending differs from large business lending, either in terms of costs or [public] 
benefits. Second, they had to think that imperfections exist in the [private] small business 
credit market that prevent the market from delivering the economically efficient amount 
                                                 
5 Current public policy goals recognized by the SBA are as follows: (1) business district revitalization, (2) 
expansion of exports, (3) expansion of minority business development, (4) rural development, (5) enhanced 
economic competition, (6) restructuring because of federally mandated standards or policies, (7) changes 
necessitated by federal budget cutbacks, (8) expansion of small business concerns owned and controlled by 
veterans, and (9) expansion of small business concerns owned and controlled by women (SBA, 2004).   
  8of credit to small businesses at market prices. Third, they must have believed that the 
SBA would have the power and expertise to help ameliorate these market imperfections. 
  Peterson (1999) suggests that small business lending is indeed different from 
large business lending on three dimensions.  Financing costs are different. Small 
businesses pay a higher fixed cost per unit of credit than larger businesses. The 
availability of information is different. Asymmetric information problems associated with 
small firms are more severe than with larger firms. The importance of relationships with 
banking institutions is different. Relationships between and banks (typically small ones) 
and small businesses are much closer than between large companies and banks, and thus 
are more valuable to both small business and to the banks..  However, these differences 
alone are not sufficient to justify government intervention in the small business credit 
market.  The economic rationale for market intervention by the SBA must be linked to 
some form of market failure.  Some suggest that market failure may exist in credit 
markets because these markets tend to be informationally imperfect.  Further, the 
economic literature documents that this market failure may take the form of equilibrium 
credit rationing. 
Market imperfections and credit rationing 
The credit rationing literature is one of the more insightful areas in modern economics.  
Two of the more important papers in this area are Kane and Malkiel (1965) and Stiglitz 
and Weiss (1981).  Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) demonstrate that price alone may not 
equilibrate demand and supply in credit markets.  They also show that the corresponding  
disequilibrium would unlikely be just a temporary phenomenon. 
  9  Importantly, Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) show that in equilibrium a loan market 
may be characterized by credit rationing.  They reason that banks making loans are 
concerned about the interest rate they receive on the loan and the riskiness of the loan.  
However, the interest rate may itself affect the riskiness of the pool of bank loans by 
either sorting potential borrowers (the adverse selection effect) or influencing the actions 
of borrowers (the moral hazard effect).  Both effects derive directly from the imperfect 
information that is present in loan markets after banks have evaluated loan applications.  
When the price (interest rate) affects the nature of the transaction, it is unlikely that price 
will also clear the market. 
  The adverse selection aspect of interest rates is a consequence of different 
borrowers having different probabilities of repaying their loan.  The expected return to 
the bank obviously depends on the probability of repayment, so the bank would like to be 
able to identify borrowers who are more likely to repay.  But it is difficult to identify 
‘good borrowers’.  Typically, the bank will use a variety of screening devices to do so.  
The interest rate that a borrower is willing to pay may act as one such screening device.  
For example, those who are willing to pay a higher interest rate are likely to be, on 
average, worse risks.  These borrowers are willing to borrow at a higher interest rate 
because they perceive their probability of repaying the loan to be lower.  As the interest 
rate rises, the average ‘riskiness’ of those who borrow increases, and this may actually 
result in lowering the bank’s expected profits.  
  Similarly, as the interest rate and other terms of the contract change, the behavior 
of the borrower is likely to also change.  For instance, raising the interest rate decreases 
the return on projects which succeed.  Higher interest rates may thus induce firms to 
  10undertake projects with lower probabilities of success but higher payoffs when 
successful.  This is the moral hazard problem. 
  For these reasons, the expected return by the bank may increase less rapidly than 
the interest rate; and, beyond a point, may actually decrease.  Clearly, under these 
conditions, it is conceivable that the demand for credit may exceed the supply of credit in 
equilibrium.  Although traditional analysis would argue that in the presence of an excess 
demand for credit unsatisfied borrowers would offer to pay a higher interest rate to the 
bank, bidding up the interest rate until demand equals supply, it does not happen in this 
case.  This is because the bank would not lend to someone who offered to pay the higher 
interest rate, as such a borrower is likely to be a worse risk than the average current 
borrower (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981).  The expected return on a loan to this borrower at 
the higher interest rate is actually lower than the expected return on the loans the bank is 
currently making.  Hence, there are no competitive forces leading supply to equal 
demand, and credit is rationed. 
  Of course, the interest rate is not the only term of the contract which is important.  
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) report that the amount of credit extended, and the amount of 
collateral the bank demands of the borrower, will also affect the behavior of borrowers 
and the distribution of borrowers.  And, as with interest rates, increasing the collateral 
requirements of borrowers may actually decrease the returns to the lender, by either 
decreasing the average degree of risk aversion of the pool of borrowers or inducing 
borrowers to undertake riskier projects. 
  Consequently, it may not be profitable to raise the interest rate or collateral 
requirements when a bank has an excess demand for credit; instead, banks may deny 
  11loans to borrowers who are observationally indistinguishable from those who receive 
loans.  This is what Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) refer to as credit rationing.   
Importance of lending relationships 
Kane and Malkiel (1965) come to a similar conclusion about the possibility of banks 
rationing credit.  But they also suggest that the extent of credit rationing depends on the 
strength of existing customer relationships; the size, stability, and prospects for future 
growth of deposits; and the existence of profitable future lending opportunities.  That is, 
loans may be rationed to current and prospective borrowers in accordance with the 
cohesion of the existing relationships along with expectations about the future 
profitability of those relationships. 
  Petersen and Rajan (1994) extended the notion that relationships are important 
factors in determining credit rationing.  They suggest that the causes of credit rationing, 
adverse selection and moral hazard, may be more prominent when firms are young or 
small.  However, through close and continued interaction, a firm may provide a lender 
with sufficient information about, and a voice in, the firm’s affairs so as to lower the cost 
and increase the availability of credit.  These authors also suggest that an important 
dimension of a relationship is its duration.  Conditional on its positive past experience 
with the borrower, the bank may expect future loans to be less risky.  This should reduce 
its expected cost of lending and increase its willingness to provide funds.   
  Petersen and Rajan (1994) suggest that in addition to interaction over time, 
relationships can be built through interaction over multiple products.  That is, borrowers 
may obtain more than just loans from a bank.  Borrowers may purchase a variety of 
financial services and also maintain checking and savings accounts with the bank.  These 
  12added dimensions of a relationship can affect the firm’s borrowing cost in two ways.  
First they increase the precision of the lender’s information about the borrower.  For 
example, the lender can learn about the firm’s sales by monitoring the cash flowing 
through its checking account or by factoring the firm’s accounts receivables.  Second, the 
lender can spread any fixed costs of producing information about the firm over multiple 
products.  Petersen and Rajan (1994) report that both effects reduce the lender’s costs of 
providing loans and services, and the former effect increases the availability of funds to 
the firm. 
  Berger and Udell (1995) also study the importance of relationships in the 
extension of credit to small firms.  They find that small firms with longer banking 
relationships borrow at lower rates and are less likely to pledge collateral than are other 
small firms.  These effects appear to be both economically and statistically significant.  
According to Berger and Udell, these results suggest that banks accumulate increasing 
amounts of this private information over the duration of the bank-borrower relationship 
and use this information to refine their loan contract terms. 
  Because relationships may be more costly for small businesses to establish 
relative to large businesses, and because lack of relationships may lead to severe credit 
rationing in the small business credit market, some form of government intervention to 
assist small businesses in establishing relationships with lenders may be appropriate.  
However, the nature of intervention must be carefully evaluated.  SBA’s guaranteed 
lending programs may well be a reasonable intervention as they serve as a form of 
substitute for small business collateral. The program also reduces the risk to the lender of 
establishing a relationship with informationally opaque small business borrowers.  
  13Finally, the SBA loan guarantee programs may improve the intermediation process by  
lowering the risk to the lender of extending longer-term loans, ones that more closely 
meet the needs of small businesses for capital investment.  After all, the problem 
Congress is said to have worried about, is long-term credit for small businesses. 
4.  The questions,  empirical strategy, and data  
Our empirical research focuses on SBA loan guarantees, which are only one of the 
several ways the government promotes small business lending. Federal Home Loan 
Banks, for example, are authorized by Congress to accept small enterprise loans as 
eligible collateral when they extend subsidized advances to banks, which reduces the cost 
of funding small business loan portfolios.
6  We chose to study the impact of SBA loan 
guarantees because if government intervention in the small business credit market is 
effective, the evidence is likely to be strongest in the SBA programs. This is because 
SBA loan guarantees more completely resolve the agency problems that give rise to 
credit rationing in these markets than do other approaches, like that of the Federal Home 
Loan Banks.  SBA programs also encompass all types of small business lenders, from 
community banks and thrifts to bigger banks.  Finally, the SBA has operated for a long 
time—more than a half a century. 
  We take as our maintained hypothesis that credit market frictions—primarily in 
the form of costly information and verification of a small firm’s projects—can lead to 
socially suboptimal credit allocation.  To the extent that SBA loan guarantee programs 
mitigate credit market frictions, there should be a relationship between SBA-guaranteed 
lending and economic growth and development. Therefore, we test for whether SBA loan 
                                                 
6 See Craig and Thomson (2003) for a more complete discussion of the FHLBs’ role in supporting small 
firm finance. 
  14guarantees lessen credit market frictions by testing for whether measures of SBA lending 
are related to local economic growth.  Thus, our null hypothesis is that SBA lending has 
no discernible impact on local market economic growth. 
  To examine this SBA growth hypothesis we utilize data from three sources.  The 
first source is loan-specific data—including borrower and lender information—on all 
SBA-guaranteed 7(a) and 504 loans from 2 January 1990 through 31 December 2002.  A 
breakdown of loan size, total credit and number of loans under each guarantee program is 
displayed in tables A1 through A3 of the appendix.  The second source is data on 
economics conditions from the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) and the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) from 
1990 through 2001.  The third source is data from the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation’s (FDIC) annual summary of deposit data (SUMD) files.  All of our data are 
aggregated to the local market level.  We use Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) to 
define the relevant local market for urban areas and non-MSA counties as the local 
market for rural areas.  We focus on local markets because we suspect that it is at this 
level where the SBA-guaranteed lending should have the greatest impact.  Hence, our 
data set consists of approximately 2200 local market observations per year over 12 years 
(1990 through 2001). 
  To test our null hypothesis we construct two sets of regression equations in which 
measures of local economic conditions are related to proxy variables for SBA lending 
and the structure of the local financial market.  Also included are controls for national 
economic conditions.  A second set of regression equations relate proxies for economic 
  15growth to levels and changes in SBA lending and market structure variables.  Our model 
is:  
t t t t t t
t t t t t t
EMPR SBAM A SBA SBAG MSA
HERF NBER EMPR SBADEP PCIAP PICAP
ε α α α α α
α α α α α α
+ + + + + +
+ + + + + =
− − − −
− −
1 10 1 9 1 8 1 7 6
5 4 3 1 2 1 1 0
7           
 (1) 
Equation (1) uses per capita income (PICAP) in the local market level to proxy for 
economic conditions. The primary variable of interest on the right side of the equation is 
SBADEPt-1 (the total dollar amount of SBA-guaranteed loans scaled by total deposits in 
the market lagged one year).  We scale by total deposits instead of measures of total 
credit because we cannot construct measures of bank lending at the local market level.  
Market-level deposit data are available, however, from the SUMD data, and total deposits 
should be highly correlated with lending.  We also include as controls for the impact of 
SBA lending: the share of SBA loans that are 7(a) loans (SBA7A), the share of SBA loans 
provided to manufacturing concerns (SBAM), and the SBA’s exposure on the outstanding 
balances of the SBA-guaranteed loans (SBAG).   
  Two variables are included in equation (1) to control for the structure of the local 
market.  The first variable is the deposit market Herfindahl index (HERF), which 
provides a measure of the relative concentration, and presumably the relative 
competitiveness, of the local banking markets.  The second variable is a dummy variable 
(MSA) that captures whether the market is urban (MSA = 1) or rural (MSA = 0).  Finally, 
we include the employment rate (EMPR) for the market and a dummy variable for NBER 
recessions (NBER = 1 if the national economy is in a recession, 0 otherwise) to control 
for local and national economic conditions.  The definitions of the variables used in the 
empirical analysis are in table 1.   
  16  Finding a positive and significant relationship between the level of per capita 
income and SBA-guaranteed loans in a local market is inconsistent with the null 
hypothesis of no connection between these loans and economic conditions.  However, we 
might also observe this positive correlation between economic performance and SBA-
guaranteed lending activity if the probability of a lender offering an SBA-guaranteed loan 
is positively related to local market economic conditions.  In other words, the higher level 
of income might cause the lagged SBA-guaranteed lending rather than the other way 
around, in part because it incorporates past growth rates.  Therefore, we investigate 
whether SBA-guaranteed lending activity is related to local economic growth.  To do this 
we estimate the following regression equation: 
t t t
t t t t
t t t t t
t t t t t
LNSBAM A LNSBA
LNSBAG LNEMPR LNDEP LNSBA
HERF MSA NBER LNDEP LNSBA
LNEMPR LNDEP LNSBA LPI LNPI
µ β β
β β β β
β β β β β
β β β β β
+ + +
+ + + +
+ + + ∆ + ∆ +
∆ + ∆ + ∆ + + = ∆
− −
− − − −
− −
−
2 15 2 14
2 12 1 12 2 11 2 10
9 8 7 1 6 1 5
4 3 2 1 1 0
7             
              
            
 (2) 
  The dependent variable in equation (2) in the log change in personal income from 
t-1 to t (∆LNPIt).
7  The primary regressors of interest are the log change in small business 
loans (∆LNSBAt), the lagged log change in small business loans (∆LNSBAt-1) and the log 
level of small business loans lagged two periods (LNSBAt-2).  Under our null hypothesis 
that SBA loan guarantees have no discernable impact on economic growth, we would 
expect the coefficients on LNSBAt-2, ∆LNSBAt and ∆LNSBAt-1 to be insignificant.  Thus 
this estimating equation differs from the first in two ways: it shifts the focus from 
possible past changes of personal income (that contribute to its current level) to a single 
contemporaneous change, and it also observes more dynamics in the effects of past SBA-
                                                 
7 To preserve observations with a value of zero we add one to all observations prior to taking the natural 
logarithm. 
  17guaranteed activity on that contemporary change.  Positive and significant coefficients on 
these SBA lending variables would be evidence consistent with the hypothesis that SBA 
loan guarantees improve the efficiency of lending markets.  As before, we include 
controls for market structure (HERF and MSA),economic conditions (LNEMPR, 
∆LNEMPR, and LNPIt-1) in equation (2), as well as controls for level and growth in 
deposits (LNDEPt-2, ∆LNDEPt, ∆LNDEPt-1).  We also include the values of controls for 
the type of SBA lending in the market lagged two periods. 
5.  The empirical results 
Levels regression 
Equation 1 is estimated using weighted least squares at the local market level for every 
MSA (urban) and non-MSA county (rural) for which we have complete data over the 
period 1991 through 2001.  We start the analysis in 1991 because our SBA loan data 
begins in 1990 and our empirical specification includes the lagged value of the dependent 
variable and the lagged small business lending variables on the right side of the equation.  
Equation (1) is reestimated over the urban and rural samples—excluding the MSA 
dummy variable.  Descriptive statistics for the variables used in the regression can be 
found in table 2 and the estimation results are presented in table 3. 
  Consistent with our null hypothesis, the coefficient on the lagged SBA loan-to-
deposit ratio is positive but not significantly different from zero for all three samples.
8  
This result is not surprising; after all, SBA-guaranteed lending is a small part of the total 
banking market—less than 7.5 percent of market deposits on average.  SBA-guaranteed 
lending may be too small economically for the data to yield a statistical relationship 
                                                 
8 The results are essentially the same when equation (1) is estimated with the SBA variables (SBADEP, 
SBAMR, SBA7AR and SBAGR) on the right hand side are lagged two periods. 
  18between it and per capita income.  In other words, while an insignificant coefficient on 
SBADEPt-1 is consistent with with SBA loan guarantees having no discernable impact on 
local economic growth, tests focusing on levels of economic activity may not have the 
power to reject the null hypothesis. 
  For the full sample and the urban (MSA) sample, the coefficients on SBAGRt-1 
and SBA7ARt-1 are significantly negative, while the coefficient on SBAMRt-1 is positive 
and significant.  These results are largely in concert with an explanation that says lenders 
are relying more heavily on SBA loan guarantees to make loans in more depressed urban 
markets—ones with lower per capita income.  Further results from our urban sample 
suggest that there are more opportunities for lenders to make loans to small businesses 
engaged in manufacturing when markets are more economically vibrant.  The picture 
painted by our SBA lending structure variables is somewhat different for the rural (non-
MSA) sample, where only the coefficient on SBAGRt-1 is significantly different from 
zero.  In other words, lenders in higher-income rural markets rely more heavily on SBA 
guarantees than lower-income ones.  This result is likely due to differences in economic 
activity across rural markets and the operation of government-subsidized lending 
programs for agriculture, like the farm credit banks.  To the extent that per capita income 
in rural markets is negatively related to the share of economic activity in agriculture, we 
would expect demand for SBA loan guarantees to be positively related to income.  
Hence, the positive and significant coefficient on SBAGRt-1.  
  For all three samples the controls for economic activity—NBER dummy, 
PICAPt-1, and EMPR—are significant and with the anticipated signs.  The coefficient on 
HERF (deposit market Herfindahl index) is significantly negative for the full sample and 
  19for the rural sample.  The coefficient on HERF is negative but not significant in the urban 
sample.  These results are in line with the industrial organization literature and may be 
explained in at least two ways.  First, per capita income is higher in more competitive 
markets, and HERF is a proxy for market competition.  Or, second, the negative 
correlation is the result of a set of market dynamics in which higher relative per capita 
income induces more commercial banks to enter the local market.  Furthermore, 
considering the substantial fixed cost associated with market entry, markets with 
relatively larger aggregate income levels might also experience more entry.  Both of these 
theories would support  the perception that urban financial markets are more contestable 
than rural ones.   
Rates of change regressions 
The results for economic activity and small business lending in levels, equation (1), 
provides us with the empirical relationship between the amount of SBA-guaranteed 
lending scaled by market deposits and the level of per capita income. This, however, is a 
static view of the relationship between SBA lending and economic activity and an 
indirect test of the hypothesis that SBA loan guarantees improve social-welfare-reducing 
credit rationing in small business lending markets. A more direct test of this hypothesis is 
to look at the change in personal income over time as it relates to past levels of SBA 
lending activity and subsequent changes in SBA-guaranteed lending.  To this end we 
estimate equation (2) using the same sample breakdowns as before, but over the 1992-to-
2001 time frame because we need to lag SBADEP by two periods.  Descriptive statistics 
for the variables used in equation (2) are found in table 4, and the regression results in 
table 5. 
  20  Table 5 shows that SBA-guaranteed lending does affect the growth of income in 
the market as the coefficient on LNSBAt-2 (the natural log of SBA-guaranteed loans 
lagged two periods) is positive and significant for all three samples.  Interestingly, the 
impact of SBA-guaranteed lending on income growth is more than 12 times larger in 
urban than rural markets.  In addition, we find no impact of the year-over-year change in 
SBA lending on income growth as the coefficients on ∆LNSBA and ∆LNSBAt-1 are not 
significant in any of our samples. 
  The coefficient on the log level of deposits lagged two periods is negative and 
significant for the full sample and the MSA sample.  It is positive but not significant for 
the non-MSA sample.  In other words, growth in personal income does not appear to be 
related to the level of local deposits in non-MSAs.  This result is consistent with Craig 
and Thomson’s (2002) finding that community banks in rural counties are not funding 
constrained.  However, in MSAs we interpret these results as being consistent with an 
explanation that says that the fastest-growing markets are able to attract capital from 
other regions, including foreign capital. The positive and significant coefficients on the 
log change in deposit variables (∆LNDEP and ∆LNDEPt-1) for all three samples suggest 
that growth in the local funding markets positively affects income growth. 
  The three variables that capture the structure of SBA-guaranteed lending  
(SBAGRt-2, SBA7ARt-2 and SBAMRt-2), lagged two periods, all enter with significantly 
negative coefficients for the full sample and MSA sample regressions.  For the non-MSA 
sample regression SBA7ARt-2 and SBAMRt-2 have significantly negative and significantly 
positive coefficients, respectively—the coefficient on SBAGRt-2 is negative and 
insignificant.  These results suggest that lenders are less likely to rely on SBA loan 
  21guarantees when making small business loans, and in particular loans to small 
manufacturers, in urban markets where they anticipate strong growth.  As with the levels 
results, the positive sign on SBAMRt-2 is likely the consequence of higher demand for 
manufacturing loans in rural markets, where income is growing the fastest.  Finally, the 
coefficients on our controls for economic income and local market structure are generally 
in line with what we found for the levels regressions.  
  Overall, our regression results are consistent with the hypothesis that SBA loan 
guarantees have positive, albeit small net, social benefits.  We find little evidence that the 
level of SBA-guaranteed lending activity (per $1000 of deposits) is related to the level of 
per capita income at the local market level.  However, we find a strong relationship 
between the level of SBA-guaranteed lending and future income growth in the full 
sample and the urban and rural market subsamples.  This impact of SBA-guaranteed 
lending on growth appears to be small, as the largest coefficient on the LNSBAt-1 
regressor is 50 basis points.   
6.  Conclusions and extensions to the analysis 
SBA loan guarantee programs are one of many government interventions into markets 
aimed at promoting small business.  The rationale for these guarantees appears to be that 
credit market imperfections can result in small enterprises being credit rationed—
particularly for longer-term loans for purposes such capital expansion.  If SBA loan 
guarantees indeed reduce credit rationing in the markets for small business loans, then 
there should be a relationship between measures of SBA activities and economic growth.  
This is what we find.  While the data fail to produce a significant positive relationship 
between SBA-guaranteed lending (adjusted for market size) and per capita income in a 
  22market, there is a positive (although small) and significant relationship between the level 
of SBA lending in a market and future personal income growth.   
  These results should be considered preliminary, however.  The difference between 
our results for per capita income and for per capita income growth suggest several 
possible mechanisms.  First, the stock of personal income is so large (and so poorly 
measured) that annual policy regressions will not pick up any effect on it, while the flow 
of change of personal income might be more clearly measured.  On the other hand, the 
first-differencing of personal income might represent a statistical method to take into 
account failures in the restrictions that are imposed on the model.  There may be 
unobserved characteristics that are true of counties that influence both the level of 
personal income and the amount of small business lending.  For example, SBA offices 
could be well developed in areas that are known to have been poorly developed but have 
a good potential.  This ‘potential’ is an unobserved variable that may bias our regressions 
of levels of personal income, whereas first-differencing the variables may help with the 
bias.  Further statistical work is needed to clarify the nature of our unobserved error term 
in order to sharpen our understanding of both the statistical structure of our data and our 
interpretation of the results. 
  Our initial estimation imposes other restrictions on the model which may not hold 
in practice.  For instance, we can test the restriction that SBA-guaranteed lending has the 
same impact on income growth in markets with high and low income (as measured by 
whether it is above or below the median).  Future work will relax these restrictions and 
thereby more fully utilize the information in our panel data.  In addition, we plan on 
extending this work by adding controls for state and regional growth, differences in state 
  23taxes, and credit cycles. Finally, before we can effectively apply our results to policy 
restrictions, our estimates need to be posed in the context of a structural model of credit 
constraints.  Identifying such a model, both theoretically and empirically, is tough.  This 
ambitious goal is the aim of our extended research project. 
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Table 2:  Descriptive Statistics for Equation (1) Variables 
 
 Variable  N  Mean  Std Dev  Minimum  Maximum 
 PICAP  24872 18.9273  4.5517  6.09  58.70 
 SBADEPt-1
a
  24872 7.4450  100.8813  0  8754.2 
 HERF
b  24872 0.5309  0.2884  0.03  1 
 EMPR (%)  24872 93.9186  3.2051  61.47  99.30 
 NBER  24872 0.1810  0.3850  0  1 
 MSADUM  24872 0.1389  0.3458  0  1 
 SBAGRt-1  24872 0.6205  0.3536  0  1 
 SBA7ARt-1  24872 0.6737  0.4263  0  1 
 SBAMRt-1  24872 0.1149  0.2356  0  1 
 PICAPt-1  24872 18.2244  4.3781  5.50  58.70 
 MDUM
c  24872 0.2378  0.4257  0  1 
Source:  Small Business Administration, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, and authors' Calculations 
Notes:  a.   Guaranteed small business loans per $000 of deposits. 
b.  The Herfindahl index has been normalized to a variable between 0 and 1. 
c.  For markets where there was no recorded SBA guaranteed loan information we set 
the value of the SBA lending proxies to 0 and set MDUM = 1 (0 otherwise). 
 



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4:  Descriptive Statistics for Equation (2) Variables 
 
 Variable  N  Mean  Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
 LNPIt-1 22479  13.0605 1.5110  8.48  19.72 
 LNSBAt-2   22479  10.3557 5.9782  0.00  20.36 
 LNDEPt-2
a  22479 12.1852 1.4866  6.21  19.56 
 LNEMPRt-1 (%)  22479  4.5411  0.0358  4.12  4.60 
 SBAGRt-2   22479  0.6239  0.3547  0  1 
 SBA7ARt-2   22479  0.6749  0.4262  0  1 
 SBAMRt-2   22479  0.1179  0.2385  0  1 
 ∆LNSBAt-1 22479  0.1584  5.7554  -15.26  15.32 
 ∆LNDEPt-1   22479  0.0132  0.2561  -5.00  3.71 
 ∆LNSBA 22479  0.1493  5.6774  -15.26  15.32 
 ∆LNDEP 22479  0.0130  0.2653  -5.00  3.42 
 ∆LNEMPR 22479  0.0020  0.0139  -0.16  0.17 
 HERF
b  22479 0.5352  0.2881  0.03  1.00 
 NBER  22479  0.0957  0.2942  0  1 
 MSADUM
c  22479 0.1394  0.3464  0  1 
 MDUM  22479  0.3968  0.4892  0  1 
 ∆LNPI 22479  0.0458  0.0481  -0.46  0.43 
Source:  Small Business Administration, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, and authors' calculations 
Notes:  a.   $000 
b.  The Herfindahl index has been normalized to a variable between 0 and 1. 
c.  For markets where there was no recorded SBA guaranteed loan information 

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A1:  Average SBA Loan $ 
   Urban Rural  Total 
Year  504 7A  Total  504 7A  Total  Sample 
1991  262,159 207,984 213,260 300,958 205,233 213,592 213,345 
1992  302,788 244,221 249,582 316,912 232,181 238,305 246,923 
1993  325,592 250,624 258,006 346,530 244,144 252,845 256,859 
1994  341,261 205,738 218,756 334,919 184,367 195,604 213,855 
1995  350,786 150,363 169,179 364,684 125,882 145,227 164,796 
1996  376,730 190,938 213,915 341,966 145,963 168,762 206,933 
1997  369,753 224,912 238,320 310,629 174,399 188,908 231,171 
1998  385,883 236,159 253,764 308,272 199,479 212,395 247,994 
1999  412,650 253,674 270,483 335,416 195,475 211,379 263,591 
2000  427,095 260,575 277,788 343,140 197,743 213,899 269,633 
2001  440,611 241,833 264,551 361,987 195,511 216,531 257,741 
Sample  377,773 221,391 237,727 335,527 184,414 199,225 231,391 
Source:  United States Small Business Administration and authors’ calculations 
 
 
Table A2:  Total SBA Loans ($000) 
   Urban Rural  Total 
Year 504  7A  Total  504  7A  Total Sample 
1991  168,044 1,235,636 1,403,680 58,687 418,265 476,952 1,880,632 
1992  380,301 3,043,969 3,424,270 96,975 912,007 1,008,982 4,433,252 
1993  564,577 3,978,656 4,543,233 148,315 1,125,014 1,273,329 5,816,562 
1994  1,015,593 5,761,698 6,777,291 207,985 1,419,439 1,627,423 8,404,715 
1995  1,165,310 4,821,247 5,986,557 234,127 916,799 1,150,926 7,137,483 
1996  1,727,682 6,204,515 7,932,197 269,811 874,902 1,144,713 9,076,910 
1997  1,219,816 7,273,196 8,493,012 199,424 939,313 1,138,736 9,631,748 
1998  1,464,425 6,725,796 8,190,221 191,437 919,600 1,111,037 9,301,258 
1999  1,521,028 7,908,288 9,429,316 175,423 797,344 972,767  10,402,083 
2000  1,319,722 6,984,461 8,304,183 166,766 768,827 935,593 9,239,776 
2001  1,238,118 5,266,396 6,504,514 185,699 694,065 879,765 7,384,279 
Sample  11,784,617 59,203,858 70,988,475 1,934,647 9,785,575 11,720,223 82,708,698 
Source:  United States Small Business Administration and authors’ calculations 
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Table A3: Total Number of SBA Loans 
   Urban Rural  Total 
Year 504  7A  Total  504  7A  Total  Sample 
1991  641 5941  6,582 195 2038 2,233  8,815 
1992  1256 12464  13,720 306 3928 4,234  17,954 
1993  1734 15875  17,609 428 4608 5,036  22,645 
1994  2976 28005  30,981 621 7699 8,320  39,301 
1995  3322 32064  35,386 642 7283 7,925  43,311 
1996  4586 32495  37,081 789 5994 6,783  43,864 
1997  3299 32338  35,637 642 5386 6,028  41,665 
1998  3795 28480  32,275 621 4610 5,231  37,506 
1999  3686 31175  34,861 523 4079 4,602  39,463 
2000  3090 26804  29,894 486 3888 4,374  34,268 
2001  2810 21777  24,587 513 3550 4,063  28,650 
Sample  31,195 267,418 298,613 5,766 53,063 58,829 357,442 
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